Genetic Testing of Children for Late Onset Disease by McConnell, Terrance C. & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Special Section: Open Forum
Genetic Testing of Children
for Late Onset Disease
MARY ANN SEVICK, DONNA G. NATIVIO, and TERRANCE MCCONNELL
Over the past decade, genetic tests have become available for a wide variety of
disorders. As a result we are able to predict, with some degree of certainty,
whether or not an individual will develop such diseases as breast cancer,
Huntington’s disease, polycystic kidney disease, and familial adenomatous
polyposis. The ability to predict disease poses several unique ethical consider-
ations for clinical decisionmaking regarding the provision of genetic testing.
Patients must be able to comprehend the complexities of genetic testing and the
potential meaning of the results. Patients must consider the emotional, social,
and economic consequences of revelations regarding their risk status. Also,
obtaining information on risk status may have implications for persons other
than the individual seeking genetic testing.
The decision to test children for risk of genetic disease is further complicated
by the fact that, until they reach the age of majority or are deemed emancipated
minors, parents must make decisions on their behalf. Children have particular
developmental, social, and emotional vulnerabilities that must be considered in
any decision to conduct genetic testing and/or impart results to them. Policies
regarding genetic testing in children seem to vary according to whether any
medical benefit is to be expected from testing. For example, population-based
screening for phenylketonuria, hemoglobinopathies, and galactosemia are a
routine part of pediatric care. Testing for these conditions has been shown to
reduce morbidity and mortality, and there are now few ethical concerns
regarding current population-based screening programs. Also, testing children
for genetic conditions such as cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia is relatively
uncontroversial as there are significant benefits to be derived from early
diagnosis and medical treatment. However, genetic testing becomes more
controversial when there are no or questionable medical benefits to be derived,
such as in late-onset autosomal dominant diseases. Consider the case presented
by Smith et al.1
Mr. Crawford’s son married a woman at risk for Huntington’s Disease
(HD). The couple, now divorced, was married for eight years and had
a son and daughter. The boy is now eight years old and the girl is six.
These children are at 25 percent risk for HD. Mr. Crawford believes
that the mother of his former daughter-in-law has been diagnosed
with HD; the former daughter-in-law has repeatedly said that she is
not interested in testing for herself. Mr. Crawford has other children
and grandchildren; a widower of significant means, he has been
diagnosed with inoperable cancer. He wishes to treat his grand-
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children equitably, but he believes that special needs require special
commitments. He contemplates setting up a trust fund for his son’s
children to ensure adequate care for them should they develop HD. In
order to know whether he should make these arrangements, Mr.
Crawford wants to have his grandchildren tested. (p. 72)
In considering whether or not Mr. Crawford’s request should be honored, a
panel of coauthors in Smith et al. raised the question of whether or not children
should ever be tested for HD. The majority of the panel felt that the children
should not be tested, even if testing were requested by the children’s parents.
Their conclusions were based upon the following arguments: (1) HD is a late
onset disease with high penetrance, and for which there is no known cure or
treatment. Symptoms are not likely to occur until after age 30 and, thus, it is
extremely difficult to see how testing is in the children’s medical interest. (2) In
HD, no medical advantages are lost by waiting and allowing the children to
decide for themselves whether they want to be tested. (3) Mr. Crawford may
actually have wanted the test results to favor the other children in the distri-
bution of his estate, that is, avoiding a “bad investment” in a child who carries
HD. (4) Parents should be prevented from making choices that place their
children at great risk, and the act of testing a child for HD is both risky and
irrevocable. Knowledge of HD risk status was assumed to be harmful to the
child’s self-image and possibly harmful to the parent–child relationship. The
panel notes that studies with adults have shown harmful consequences of
testing in adults, even when the results were negative.2
Paternalistic Attitudes in Arguments Regarding Refusal
of Genetic Testing in Children
To what extent is the view proposed by Smith et al. paternalistic? When we
refer to paternalism in the ethics literature, we generally think in terms of the
liberty-limiting principle that we may force a person to do something or that
we should be able to do something to another person for that person’s own
good. Philosophers generally distinguish between two types of paternalism,
weak and strong. Weak paternalism justifies doing something to the person
without their consent and for their own good but only when the voluntariness
of the person’s conduct is in question —such as when the person has a serious
mental defect, is ignorant, or his/her decisionmaking is otherwise impaired.
Strong paternalism justifies doing something to the person without their consent
or for their own good, even when the person’s behavior is substantially
voluntary. In other words, strong paternalism involves interfering with an agent’s
autonomous choices.3 When cases of paternalism are described in the literature,
they usually involve some direct action, such as a procedure or test being
performed because it is felt to be in the patient’s best interest. However,
paternalism may also refer to decisions not to take action on patients’ requests,
because the actions are not believed to be in their best interest.
According to Faden and Beauchamp, medicine has a long history of pater-
nalism.4 In the interest of “doing no harm” Hippocratic writings advised
physicians to “[conceal] most things from the patient . . . .[Turn] his attention
away from what is being done . . . and [reveal] nothing about the patient’s future
or present condition.” Not until the 18th century were physicians encouraged
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to share information with their patients, and only then to encourage their
adherence to medical care. Deception and falsehood have historically been seen
as acceptable as long as the objective was to give hope to the patient. It was
only in 1980 that the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical Ethics
was revised to include injunctions for physicians to deal honestly with patients
and to respect their rights.5 In recent years, with the consumer movement of
the 1970s and 1980s, and the recent focus on issues of consent in clinical
studies, the autonomy model has begun to take precedence over the benefi-
cence model. Consequently, it has become more difficult to justify cases of
strong paternalism.
As the decisionmaking agent for their families, we argue that prohibiting
parents from having access to genetic testing of their children for HD is like
traditional definitions of strong paternalism in that others are presuming to
know what is best for the family. It is unlike strong paternalism in that the
freedom of the parents is being restricted for the alleged good of the children
(i.e., not the parents themselves). Against this notion of quasi-strong paternal-
ism we present the following arguments for disclosure of children’s HD status
to their parents based on (1) alternative explanations of the harms and benefits
to the child of limited disclosure of HD status, (2) the harm of medicalizing
issues of death and dying, and (3) the usefulness of a model of “constrained
parental autonomy” in medical decisionmaking as it pertains to children.
In the case in question, the mother has indicated that she does not want any
information about her risk status and, if she were to learn that one of her
children has HD, the mother will know that she also has the disease. With this
being the case one can assume that parental consent to have the children tested
has not been obtained from both parents, which complicates the case some-
what. However, Smith et al. argue that, regardless of the parents’ wishes,
children should not be tested for HD.6 It is this conclusion that we will criticize
in the paper.
Harms and Benefits of Permitting Genetic Testing in Children
How Harmful Is the Truth for Parents?
Consequentialist arguments against childhood testing for HD would include
the following: (1) knowing HD status would cause harm, negatively influenc-
ing the child’s self-image, causing undue anxiety, and altering normal parent–
child interactions and (2) knowing HD status would provide no medical
benefits for the child. Thus, testing is wrong because it involves risks with no
attendant medical benefits.
Several researchers have found severe illness episodes in infancy (e.g.,
prematurity, low birth weight, and problems at birth) to be linked to a
persistent sense of vulnerability and protectiveness on the part of the parent
despite the child’s obvious health.7 A major assumption in the “vulnerable
child” literature is that past health events disproportionately affect maternal
assessment of the subsequent health of the child and may be harmful to the
child. However, more recent research does not support the persistence of the
vulnerable child syndrome and has demonstrated a lack of association between
health in infancy and later maternal ratings of current health in school-age
children.8 Furthermore, findings of vulnerable child syndrome in families
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experiencing severe infant health events should not be generalized to families
with children at risk of a late onset genetic disease. No empirical studies
supporting a relationship between knowledge of a child’s genetic risk and
altered parenting were found in the literature. However, even if we were to
assume that the population in question may be subject to vulnerable child
syndrome or other unhealthy parenting behavior, we would make the follow-
ing arguments. (1) All children known to be at risk of late onset genetic disease
are at risk to suffer this syndrome whether they have been tested or not.
Parents generally know that their child is at risk for HD, and may treat tested
children no differently than untested children. (2) Parental perceptions of child
vulnerability may be exacerbated in the absence of information. Not knowing
the truth and being left to wonder may cause more anxiety than hearing the
truth. Parents may become overvigilant, watching for each and every sign that
their child is affected. (3) At least some vulnerable child syndrome cases could
be avoided by providing parents with accurate information.
Is Disclosure of Genetic Risk Harmful to the Child?
Clearly, there are circumstances in which disclosing genetic risk is harmful to a
child. However, as they grow, children become increasingly able to use
complex reasoning, to understand death, and to imagine a future for them-
selves.9 Most parents are fully capable of determining where their children
are in this developmental process and how and when children should be told
of their risk status. Unfortunately, no empirical data exist to suggest the
harms or benefits of revealing genetic risk to children or the optimal timing
of disclosure.
We do know a few things about children’s response to disclosure of parental
illness. Barnes et al. conducted a recent qualitative study of how parents
communicate with their children regarding maternal breast cancer.10 Most
parents informed their children of the diagnosis, and gave the following
reasons for doing so: (1) maintaining open communication was important and
would help in coping with the future, (2) open communication was important
for maintaining trust, and (3) open communication was expected to alleviate
children’s distress. Nelson et al. found that when children are told of a
diagnosis of their parent’s cancer, anxiety levels are lower and communication
within the family is improved.11
With respect to telling children bad news about themselves, no research was
found regarding disclosure of HD to children. However, studies of HIV, cancer,
leukemia, and other chronic illness indicate that disclosure may be instructive.
Goldman, in her work with terminally ill children, notes that children always
know more than their parents think they do, and that families who maintain
open communication cope most effectively when told bad news.12 In a study of
long-term survivors of pediatric cancer, Slavin et al. found that good psycho-
social adjustment was associated with patients’ early knowledge of their
diagnosis and posited that when there is no disclosure children may feel
isolated, develop mistrust, and have frightening fantasies.13 We have long
known that young patients with serious illness are aware of their illness and
that not being told increases their anxiety.14 Children sense distress and sadness
of those around them despite our efforts to behave in a normal manner and,
without being told, come to understand that they are ill.
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Obviously, disclosure of a parent’s or child’s HD status to the child will
require consideration of the developmental level of the child. A review and
critique of the cognitive developmental literature addressing children’s con-
cepts of illness15 revealed that illness concept varied with developmental level,
that is, Piaget’s prelogical, concrete logical, and formal logical.16 There was a
significant association between cognitive developmental level and understand-
ing of illness cause and the treatment of illness.17 Less cognitively mature
children conceived of illness as a moral issue and were more likely to feel they
were to be blamed.18 Thus, the ability of the child to understand his or her
illness will need to be considered in any discussion of genetic testing and
disclosure of results.
Can Healthcare Professionals Accurately Predict
How People Will Respond to Bad News?
Researchers have shown that disabled patients are less concerned with their
physical disabilities than are clinicians.19 Studies have also shown clinicians to
underestimate the quality of life of disabled persons. Perhaps some of the
reticence to disclose HD status may be a function of the biases of clinicians
toward the sick and disabled, rather than a realistic assessment of how such
news will be received. We admit that some studies have shown adults to
experience negative reactions to news about their HD status. However, we
argue that it is unrealistic to expect such individuals to have a positive or
neutral response on being told that they will develop the disease. Furthermore,
one might argue that growing up with the knowledge that one has HD might
be less traumatic than anxiously watching for signs year after year or trying
over a period of years to deny personal risk, only to be told the unwelcome
news later in life. Studies also show that some individuals experience a
negative reaction to being told that they do not have the disorder. Such a
negative response could be avoided altogether by early testing.
Are Medical Benefits the Only Important Benefits to Be Considered?
We argue that medical interests are not the only interests to be considered.
Children have a variety of personal and economic interests, and may benefit by
their parents’ awareness of their HD status. In the case in question, the children
with HD could clearly benefit from their grandfather’s estate. Ultimately,
persons affected by HD will require some form of long-term care. The long-
term care system in the United States is pieced together from a variety of
service providers and payer systems, and patients requiring long-term care
often have a difficult time obtaining the appropriate level of care at an
affordable price. Insurance coverage for homecare options such as adult day
care, homecare, and respite care is virtually nonexistent. Thus, unless resources
are available to pay for homecare, individuals with HD may find themselves in
a nursing home long before institutionalization is absolutely necessary. On the
other hand, disclosure of HD status may have negative consequences in terms
of employment opportunities and the opportunity to obtain insurance cover-
age. Such risks are real but should be weighed against the potential economic
benefits to be gained by planning for future contingencies.
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Parents can also provide appropriate guidance to their children regarding
career choices that will maximize their productivity, safety, and quality of life.
In the case of HD, parents may provide anticipatory guidance pertaining to
career choices and encourage the development of interests and hobbies that do
not require fine motor skills, enabling their children to maintain work and
leisure activities after becoming symptomatic. Parents can encourage a sense of
responsibility on the part of the entire family, which may benefit affected
children in the form of a long-term commitment of siblings to support each
other.
Medical Arguments for Early Testing
An additional consideration in support of earlier testing for late onset diseases
such as Huntington’s is the phenomenon of “anticipation.” Anticipation, a term
used to describe the tendency for age of onset of a dominantly inherited
disorder to be earlier in the offspring than it was in the parent, is operative in
Huntington’s Disease. As many as 10% of affected individuals with HD have
symptoms by age 20.20 Thus, although the typical age of onset is in middle age,
it may begin at anytime between childhood and old age.21
Juvenile onset (,21 years) is a variant of Huntington’s Disease, some cases of
which show special clinical and hereditary features.22 Marked rigidity, severe
mental deterioration, pronounced motor and ceribellar symptoms, rapid decline,
and epilepsy characterize early onset cases.23 Any family where the possibility
of Huntington’s Disease exists should be referred to a genetic professional for
a pedigree analysis and detailed genetic counseling. If there is evidence of
anticipation within a pedigree and the age of onset is earlier with each
generation, then it is reasonable to seek a genetic diagnosis in childhood as a
basis for planning for care of the child, as well as preparing other members of
the family.
Finally, limiting the testing for Huntington’s Disease to those over 18 ignores
the fact that transmission of the defect via reproduction is possible well before
that age.24 It is acknowledged in the ASHG/ACMG Report that a substantial
psychosocial benefit to the competent adolescent may be a justification for
genetic testing.25 Relevant issues include the impact on decisions relating to
reproduction. In addition prenatal testing DNA analysis is available for fetuses
at 50% risk. Fetuses at 25% risk can also be tested using linkage analysis in such
a way that the genetic status of the at-risk parent is not revealed.
Medicalization of Death and Dying
Demographic and technological changes in the 20th century have resulted in
death becoming a taboo subject. In former times, early death was not uncom-
mon. People lived in constant anticipation of death, and as a result death was
treated as a normal part of existence. Today’s society has experienced increased
longevity as a result of reductions in mortality among childbearing women,
infants, and children. Mortality rates have also declined from improvements in
nutrition and social and working conditions and technological advances in
medicine including vaccines, antibiotics, and modern treatments such as trans-
plants and dialysis. As a result of these changes, death is generally something
that comes to individuals who have lived a reasonably long life. As a result, we
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have pushed death and dying onto the margins of our social consciousness.26
Researchers have shown that discussions of death and dying generally do not
occur because physicians fear causing harm by giving bad news, lack knowl-
edge and training on how to deliver bad news, view death as the enemy,
anticipate disagreements within the family, and feel threatened by such discus-
sions.27 Patients also contribute to lack of communication concerning issues of
death and dying by actively avoiding such discussions.28
Also, because of the increasingly technological nature of medicine and the
application of these technologies to those who are dying, we have relegated
responsibility for dealing with death to healthcare professionals and the insti-
tutions where they work. This institutionalization of death has had several
negative consequences. Efficiency requires routinization of care, which can be
dehumanizing to patients and families. For the sake of quality standards and
efficiency, generic plans of care are formulated for patients that are not respon-
sive to individual circumstances. In the name of institutional efficiency, health-
care professionals often do not have the time to devote to serious discussions of
illness and death, and the needs of individuals and families may not be
adequately addressed. Because the driving goals behind medical care are
curative, death is seen as a failure or an enemy. Consequently, death is not
openly acknowledged but is, rather, pushed aside. Medical outcomes (e.g.,
survival, death, evidence of medical cure) are seen as the only outcomes of
interest. Patient preferences, pain, quality of life, and social aspects of health
and illness are not addressed in the provision of medical care.
We would argue that removing from parents the decisionmaking authority
for having children tested for HD effectively reinforces the medicalization of
issues of death and dying. In doing so we stifle any meaningful discourse on
the subject. Healthcare professionals withhold information regarding genetic
risk, family members live in fear of developing HD but fail to seek confirming
tests, and families are expected to withhold information from children about
their potential risk status. Medicalization of death and dying also places
families at the mercy of a system that is not likely to meet their individual
needs. Families and society would benefit from a family-centered approach to
dealing with the question of how and when to divulged HD risk status. Under
a family-centered approach, individual needs and preferences of the family can
be considered. There is a greater likelihood that nonmedical needs, such as
quality of life and economic well-being, will be addressed. Responsibility for
discussion of death and dying can be recaptured by the family, who can
address the emotional needs of individual family members better than an
impersonal healthcare system. Death does not have to be seen as the enemy. It
can be considered a normal part of life, an attitude that is more likely to result
in a personal acceptance of one’s mortality and, consequently, a “good death.”
Families are in a better position to handle the realities of death in a positive
manner than are healthcare professionals, and can better serve as an advocate
for patients in having their needs met.
A Model of Constrained Parental Autonomy
In her book Children, Families, and Health Care Decision-Making, L.F. Ross pro-
vides an alternative model for determining the appropriateness of parental
judgments.29 Rather than evaluating parental decisions according to the “best
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interest” principle (in which the only outcome considered is whether the
decision being made optimizes the interests of the child), she argues that a
model of constrained parental autonomy is more appropriate. As surrogate deci-
sionmakers, Ross asserts that parents cannot focus solely on the needs of the
child for whom medical decisions are being made, but must consider the
interests and goals of the entire family. Under this model, parents are permitted
to make intrafamilial trade-offs among family members, provided that the basic
needs of the child are met.30 In the case of HD, knowing the children’s risk
status would permit the transfer of economic assets within the family such that
an affected child’s future long-term care needs can be addressed, provided that
the basic needs of all of their children are met.
Ross further states that parents should be allowed to make these intrafamilial
trade-offs according to their own conception of the good, provided that each
child’s basic needs are procured.31 She points out that, given no consensus on
what the good life entails, parents in a liberal society must be given great
latitude in decisionmaking pertaining to the life plans for their child. Contrary
to the positions taken by Smith et al.,32 parents may place great value on
disclosure. They may prefer to face the future head-on, rather than live in
denial. They may feel that growing up with realistic expectations is far better
than establishing life plans that must later be abandoned. Families may feel
that knowing the truth is less anxiety provoking that living in the constant
dread of discovering symptoms. Death may not be seen as the enemy.
Finally, Ross advocates great restraint on the part of institutions in scrutiniz-
ing parents and/or intervening to alter the decisions that they make pertaining
to intrafamilial trade-offs, and that judicial scrutiny should be reserved for
those transfers in which children serve as “donors” to those outside the
intimate family.33 Parents are currently given great discretion in making med-
ical treatment decisions for and with their children. It is difficult to see how
giving them information about their child is any more harmful than, say,
allowing them to consent to treatments and therapies for their children that
affect their health and survival.
Implications for Practice and Research
In some circumstances, interference with parental choices is justified. Parents
may not have healthy motivations for obtaining information on genetic risk,
may not have the emotional stability to deal with the information, or may not
be able to disclose genetic risk to their children in a sensitive manner. However,
the burden of proof should be on the healthcare professional or team that is
making such a judgment. We argue that, in investigating the reasonableness of
a request for genetic testing, a family-centered approach should be used that
recognizes the web of social relationships and contexts in which such a request
is made. It is the family that will have the responsibility of guiding the child
through his/her life. The family needs to be empowered to make the best
choices given the circumstances of the child and the values of the family.
When disclosing bad news to children the literature instructs us to consider
age and level of understanding (cognitive development, emotional adjustment,
and state of health). Bad news is delivered in an unhurried manner, in private,
with family/support persons present, with kindness, and by a clinician with
expert knowledge of the diagnosis, treatment, and resources available.34
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Additional research is needed regarding the manner in which children at
different ages deal with bad news. Descriptive research is needed on when
children born to families at known risk of HD or other late onset diseases
become aware of their own risk, how they deal with this knowledge, and their
expressed preferences for confirmation of their own risk status. Studies are
needed to determine to what extent “vulnerable child syndrome” is present in
families at known risk of late onset disorders. Descriptive studies that examine
how children perceive risk and the effectiveness of different methods of
disclosing risk would be useful in developing recommendations for parents
regarding how and when to disclose bad news to their children. We believe that
the effectiveness of different models of disclosure of children’s genetic risk
should be developed and evaluated.
In summary, we believe that the claim that genetic testing for adult-onset
disorders should never be performed on children is oversimplified and unwar-
ranted. In most cases, we believe that parents are fully capable of making
considered choices regarding genetic testing on behalf of their children. Empir-
ical evidence supporting the notion that disclosure of risk status will harm
children and families is scanty, at best. Denying access to genetic information
about their children reinforces the notion that mortality is unnatural and
something that should not be talked about. It reinforces the notion that death
and dying are best left to institutions, which have a fairly narrow perspective
on the needs of patients and families. Parents should be able to operate under
a principle of constrained autonomy, in which they are permitted to determine
“the good” for their children, and in which they can make trade-offs within the
family to maximize the well-being of all.
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